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Abstract
This article focuses on the question of whether the latest
results achieved in sciences such as evolution studies and
brain research can help us understand the nature of aesthetic
judgments. It suggests that such approaches may offer
interesting insights for understanding many problems in
aesthetics, but for clarifying aesthetic judgments one needs a
philosophical point of view. Aesthetic judgments cannot be
proven right or wrong by scientific methods, and beauty or
other aesthetic qualities cannot be directly measured. The
“method” of both making and analyzing aesthetic judgments is
discussion, and the article clarifies why this is still the case,
even if empirical, non-philosophical scientific methods are
more accurate than ever before.   
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1. Introduction: Philosophical and Non-Philosophical
Aesthetics
In the academic context aesthetics is normally understood as a
philosophical discipline. In recent years, however, more and
more books and articles have been published in which
aesthetic issues are dealt with by methods and conceptual
tools provided by natural sciences and other non-philosophical
disciplines. This non-philosophical approach to aesthetics has
a long history in experimental psychology, started by Gustav
Theodore Fechner, and the connection is understandable in
light of Alexander Baumgarten’s work, which paved the way
for the research of emotions and senses from many
perspectives, even if his own studies were still purely
philosophical. Later, new ideas were adopted from elsewhere:
from anthropology as well as from evolution, cognition, and
brain research; and various types of measurements, as well as
interviews and statistical methods, have been used.
In this article I will concentrate on the question of whether
non-philosophical approaches can help us understand the
nature of aesthetic judgments. It is sometimes hoped that the
natural sciences and other non-philosophical approaches would
take us closer to judgments that could be proved right or
wrong. At the least, judgments could be expected to be better
understood with their help.
This kind of attitude can be sensed on the web-page of the
research project Braintuning (2006–2009). As the goal of the
project is described, it becomes clear that aesthetic judgments
are approached by studying the brain with neuro-cognitive
methodology, and one aim is to find “neural determinants” of
music appreciation (italics added):
What are the neural determinants of music appreciation

and emotions? The Psychology of Aesthetics is an old
branch of Experimental Psychology that is currently
gaining new momentum in the light of neurocognitive
methodology and paradigms. The Neuroaesthetics of
Music is the field that focuses on music processing
within this framework. In this workpackage, we explore
the knowledge structure underlying music appreciation.
The conceptual structure of the aesthetics of music is
investigated. These knowledge representations reflect
music training, expertise and cultural background. This
acquired background affects our emotional as well as
aesthetic responses to music. Consequently, it also has
an effect on the brain correlates of emotional responses
to music as well as aesthetic judgments of music. [1]  
This description is fairly modest and the role of cultural
backgrounds in judgments is also included. I will later return
to notions presented by one of the group members, Mari
Tervaniemi, who refines the basic points of the project
description. In some other psychological studies, however, the
role of cultural factors is left practically unmentioned and the
focus is emphatically on neural systems and the brain. This
attitude becomes clear in some texts by Colin Martindale, who
writes that beauty judgments are closely related to certain
states in human beings’ sense organs and the brain, and are
also explicable with the help of these states. He summarizes:
“According to the theory, stimuli are judged as beautiful to the
degree that they elicit similar states in the brain.”[2]
Similarly, Wolfgang Welsch, who used to concentrate on
philosophical aesthetics, has lately been interested in nonphilosophical approaches and makes strong claims based on
the empirical findings of scientists. He is looking for universal
explanations of beauty and finds them in the brain, which has
developed to its present state through the long process of
evolution:
Rather, there are indeed universal patterns of
appreciation of beauty – aesthetic preferences valid for
humans in every culture. All humans evaluate objects
that correspond to these patterns as beautiful. /…/
Analogously, recent brain research also teaches that the
experience of the beautiful is determined by the internal
architecture of the brain, that our subjective neural
disposition is decisive for beauty – that beauty is indeed
brain happiness.[3]
In addition to this brain research, Welsch, like Denis Dutton
and Nancy Etcoff, deals with some landscape and human body
preferences that can be seen as universal in a certain way that
I will expand upon shortly. Similar results and numerous
examples are also presented in the collection, Evolutionary
Aesthetics. On the back cover of the book it states that
”Evolutionary aesthetics is the attempt to understand the
aesthetic judgment of human beings and their spontaneous
distinction between beauty and ugliness as a biologically
adapted ability to make important decisions in life” (italics
added).[4]
But if brain research reveals something universal in the
functions of the brain and neural systems, or if it can be
shown that because of the evolutionary history of the species

human beings tend to like certain kinds of human bodies,
faces, or landscapes, what does this signify for aesthetic
judgments? Not much, and certainly not enough. The
purpose of this article is not to deny the importance of nonphilosophical viewpoints for clarifying some aesthetic issues,
but to emphasize that they don’t work very well in others.
Aesthetic judgments cannot really be understood through
them, and this situation has not changed even if empirical
research methods have become more and more precise. The
aim of the article is to point out why this is the case.
2. A Typical Case of Aesthetic
Judgment                                                       
My back yard looks good and I know it just by looking at it. I
don’t doubt my own experience and that is why I can make
this aesthetic statement and be sure about it. I could describe
the backyard by saying that it is situated in the country and
that the lot is medium-sized when compared to others in the
neighborhood. These would be non-aesthetic descriptions.
A situation when someone makes an aesthetic statement
about a particular object is the basic form of aesthetic
judging. The object does not have to be a clear-cut physical
thing even if it often is (a painting, a bicycle, or a cat); but it
can also be a less defined area (a yard, a village, or a
landscape), an event, a story, or even a dream. In any case,
aesthetic evaluation presupposes one’s own, personal sense
experience of the object evaluated.
For the sake of comparison it is good to emphasize that, for
example, the size of my lot can be measured without seeing it,
if one has a good map. Correct information can be achieved
with the help of a representation, which is not the case in
aesthetic judgments. A map or any other representation is not
the lot itself. If one looks at a picture of a lot, one can
actually only evaluate aesthetic features of the picture,
although one will naturally get some idea of such features of
the object represented. But this idea may be rather far from
the object itself and one cannot really know how far without
having direct multi-sensuous contact with it.
Any two objects are different from each other in some
respects, and thus particular or unique, and in aesthetic
evaluations one is typically interested in how exactly the
particular case in question looks, sounds or is felt in a given
situation. One pays attention to the tiniest details and
nuances. Anything can be important, but one cannot know in
advance what that may be. In art and design schools,
students sometimes have to train their sensibility by
comparing two seemingly similar mass-produced objects, and
they always find differences between them: the particularity
of the objects is noticed. If one doesn’t notice it, one is not
making an aesthetic evaluation, or it is, at best, a very
superficial one. Sometimes, as in Nelson Goodman’s
thinking[5], this kind of close and detailed attention is
especially related to art, but it can be seen to belong to a
more general aesthetic attitude that can be applied anywhere.
One may make aesthetic judgments silently in one’s mind, but
they typically become more interesting and problematic when
expressed in words to others. I agree with Aarne Kinnunen,

to whom aesthetics is necessarily a social construction.[6]
Aesthetic values, opinions, and ideas are developed in social
interaction by discussing, arguing, assenting, listening, doing
art, dressing up, singing, altering traditions, etc. The
judgments made silently in one’s mind are based on this
shared and socially learned activity. Aesthetic experience, in
the essential meaning of the term, is born and exists only in
social interaction, and it is eventually identified as its own
cultural entity on the level of talking and writing.
This social existence as such does not suffice to make the
aesthetic approach its own kind of cultural entity because also
other fields such as science and religion are also socially
construed. Rather, it is a question of which issues are
emphasized in this particular construction and how the
approach defined by such emphasis is identified. The aesthetic
point of view is often indicated by the use of certain language,
such as talking about beauty, which, in turn, has its own and
many-sided cultural history and connections to other cultural
practices. Also, the importance of direct sense experience and
particularity, as mentioned above, are typically accentuated.
An object one pays attention to can be interpreted and
conceptualized in many ways, not only aesthetically, and this
means that emphasizing aesthetic aspects is a conscious
choice. Aesthetic judgments are not simple, unavoidable, and
perhaps even unconscious causal reactions to stimuli. Such
reactions do take place – an unintentional cry when one gets
frightened – but they are not aesthetic judgments.[7] This
doesn’t mean that aesthetic judgments have no ties to factors
that are not culturally determined, such as the structure of the
brain, but these don’t suffice to clarify the nature of aesthetic
evaluations.
When we talk about our aesthetic opinions we reveal them to
others. But will they agree with us? I believe that my
opinions concerning particular, individual cases can only be
strengthened or disputed by discussing them, and not even
the most exact measuring results of my brain or the largest
statistical researches on other people’s opinions could prove or
verify that my opinion is worth supporting or not. Why is this
and how does this notion characterize the aesthetic approach
in relation to some others?
3. Philosophical and Non-Philosophical Approach to
Objects of Judgment
In philosophical approaches to aesthetics it has often been
said that discussions between differing judgments cannot be
settled by referring to characteristics of evaluated objects.
This conviction has its roots in Plato’s Hippias Major, and it
was also dealt with in various ways in the taste disputes of the
eighteenth century. In modern aesthetics Frank Sibley has
probably provided the best-known formulation of the idea.
According to Sibley, aesthetic concepts like ‘beautiful,’
‘balanced,’ ‘serene,’ or ‘gaudy’ are not condition-governed. By
this he means that even if the aesthetic qualities of objects are
dependent on non-aesthetic ones – or that they are emergent
– “there are no nonaesthetic features which service in any
circumstances as logically sufficient conditions for applying
aesthetic terms.”[8] Objects may have features everyone with
normal sense abilities can detect – their size, color, and form –

but one cannot infer from them that the object must be
aesthetically of some certain kind. On top of that, it is quite
normal that one sees the non-aesthetic features of an object
but may not see some aesthetic ones, even if guided. Thus,
one cannot define aesthetic concepts on a general level. Let’s
take ‘serenity’ as an example. There are many ways individual
objects can be serene. It is possible to list typical features of
serene objects but the list may not be of particular use when
one evaluates specific cases. A monochromatic painting may
be serene because it does not have a disturbing amount of
features, but it can equally well be dull.
The idea that aesthetic concepts are not condition-governed
also have to do with another issue Sibley takes up: aesthetic
evaluations concern totalities, not singular features of them:
First, the particular aesthetic character of something
may be said to result from the totality of its relevant
non-aesthetic characteristics. It is always conceivable
that, by some relatively small change in line or color in
a picture, a note in music, or a word in a poem, the
aesthetic character may be lost or quite transformed.[9]
A slow tempo can create serenity in some cases but if the
whole is changed even slightly the piece may become boring.
Also, one has to notice the context in which the whole is
received; changing the context may have a strong impact on
the eventual judgment.[10]
This approach to understanding aesthetic judgment has been
broadly accepted for some time, but will the latest and most
exact empirical research change the situation? Those who are
convinced of the results yielded by so-called evolutionary
aesthetics can point out that it has been shown that people
coming from very different cultural backgrounds like similar
things. For example, a large part of human population values
so-called savanna landscapes that have open views, preferably
some water elements and places in which to hide (trees,
bushes). Also, a great number of men seem to prefer women
who have smooth skin, full lips, and thick hair, and whose hipwaist ratio is close to 10/7. Moreover, Welsch presents certain
geometrical forms and other visual principles such as
symmetry and the golden section that have been shown to be
universally appreciated. All such preferences have been
explained with the help of evolution: they are claimed to be
connected with adaptations that are or have been beneficial to
the survival of the species and that have thus gradually come
about in the course of evolution.[11] Cannot it thus be said
that the aesthetic quality of a savanna landscape or a certain
type of female body is an objective fact that can be proved,
even measured? If my backyard resembles a savanna, could
one statistically demonstrate that it is aesthetically
pleasurable?
One may assume that if any backyard is of the savanna type,
many would find it pleasurable. But this won’t tell us much
about judgments made about an individual backyard by
specific individuals or about how their opinions are seen by
others in social interaction. And this is what aesthetic
judgments are all about.
Problems come from many directions. Often a yard has

nothing to do with savanna landscapes but it may still be
considered aesthetically rewarding. A Japanese garden might
be more interesting to some. Also, not every beautiful woman
has full lips and thick hair. In such cases one cannot refer to
“universal” characteristics, and reasons for one’s judgments
must be given in some other way. Everything that is beautiful
is not beautiful for the same reasons; the term is extremely
elastic. Evolutionary-universal reasons for preferences and
judgments apply to some cases only.
Moreover, a yard’s resemblance to a savanna landscape does
not ensure its aesthetic value. There might be several
features in this particular case that compromise the overall
aesthetic value of the totality. There might be disturbing junk
or an unsuitable tree growing in the yard even if it is otherwise
acceptable. It is not the general category but the particular
case that counts in the end.
When can one say that a yard is of the savanna type is not a
simple question either, or that a face has smooth skin and full
lips? Even Nancy Etcoff, who supports the universal
conception of human beauty, admits that it has been shown
that a tiny, even one millimeter difference makes a face look
very different, more or less beautiful. Such nuances are
probably important in the context of landscapes and other
objects, too. Also, it has been shown that exactly the same
measurable features can be found both in the faces many find
beautiful and in the ones found to be less so.[12] Defining
universally valued objective features exactly is extremely
difficult, if not impossible. What is more important, however,
is that aesthetically significant qualities don’t need to be
exactly defined or measured. What one needs is sensecontact with the object expanded upon through discussion, but
even then categorization as such is not enough.
It is also problematic that in landscape studies the focus is
often on the pleasurable features of landscapes. But aesthetic
valuations are not necessarily connected to easily and directly
demonstrable pleasure, and indeed something can be seen as
aesthetically rewarding even if it is ugly, grotesque or
disturbing. This attitude is perhaps more common in the arts
but appears elsewhere as well. In such cases pleasure, if it is
pleasure at all, is not of the same kind as in classical and
harmonic cases, and it is not probable that similar features in
the objects would be appreciated. So, do these different cases
have different evolutionary backgrounds and explanations as
well? This might be possible, as Randy Thornhill suggests,[13]
but the idea would need more explication than she offers.
Namely, it is very unlikely that all possible variations of
aesthetic value and judgment from harmony to camp and
cheesy would have their own, particular evolutionary
explanations. Yet, all these variations do have their role in
aesthetic discussions. Evolutionary aesthetics tends to narrow
the scope of aesthetics down to a rather one-sided studying of
beauty and ugliness, which doesn’t tally with the almost
limitless scope of aesthetic discussions, and this is a problem
that bothers even some of the evolutionary aestheticians, such
as Olaf Breidbach.[14]
It is not always even clear whether something that is
considered pleasurable is aesthetically pleasurable, and this is

related to the above-mentioned notion that aesthetic
judgments are identified as such only through deliberate social
interaction. A person whose appearance is found pleasurable
can be erotically so, and in some cases there might be good
ethical reasons to act from other than the purely aesthetic
point of view. This means that pleasure as such is not a
sufficient indicator of aesthetic, or of erotic or ethical
approaches but more is needed, and typically this “more” is
verbal judgments.
The aestheticians who lean on evolutionary research do not
normally do empirical research themselves. It is often the case
that they don’t even present the empirical studies carried out
by others as carefully as could be done, although it would
obviously be important if one bases one’s philosophical
arguments on such studies. Hence it often remains unclear
what kind of research methodologies produced the results in
question, and what can thus be inferred from them. For
example, when Welsch introduces the results of landscape
preference studies he does not tell how many people have
been interviewed or studied in some other way, or whether the
researchers have used photographs or real landscapes when
finding out what people think of them. If one reads the texts
by Rachel and Stephen Kaplan, referred to by Welsch, one
finds more detailed information. In their book The Experience
of Nature,[15] where the Kaplans analyze numerous studies
more carefully than in their shorter articles,[16] it becomes
evident that many of the studies were actually based on a
rather limited series of photographs and sometimes the
number of people interviewed or otherwise studied was only in
the tens. Moreover, a long section of the book deals with
cultural differences between various landscape preferences and
not with universal conceptions.[17] The Kaplans themselves
recognize their methodological restrictions and potential. Their
point of departure necessarily results in simplifications and
generalizations that miss the particularity that, in turn, is the
basis of aesthetic judging. For example, as objects of
aesthetic judgment can be described in very many ways, the
Kaplans only use a five-level scale for their preference
studies.
Instead of taking only such points from the Kaplans or
elsewhere to support their own ideas, philosophers should
rather question the results and research procedures of
empirical studies. They could ponder whether the results
would be different if preferences were studied in real
environments and in differing weather conditions and not with
the help of photographs. And how many people should be
interviewed before it is justifiable to make generalizations?
The results would probably also be different depending on
whether people may freely choose a landscape and their way
of describing it or if they are guided to make certain choices.
If free choices are made will we get aesthetic descriptions at
all, and if so then who will identify them as such? Not every
expression of preference is an aesthetic one. And what if
especially aesthetic descriptions are asked for? What if a list
of aesthetic terms is given; will they be used of the same
things by different people? Analyses of such issues should be
done more often and carefully than has been typical for
aestheticians making use of empirical studies.

In my opinion, aesthetic issues simply have to be discussed in
order to be defined, and there is no guarantee that a
consensus can be found or that universal factors would be
very useful in such discussions. This does not mean that a
consensus would necessarily be found in, say, scientific
discussions either. In them, however, many issues that often
relate to measurements can be generally accepted and even
verified by a certain methodology. Such scientific methods
can sometimes perhaps also be used in aesthetic judgments,
as parts of them, but there they have a less central role than
in scientific discussions. Still, “aesthetic verifications,” if we
can speak of such a thing, are typically based on each
evaluator’s direct sense experiences of objects’ particular
features, not on universally agreed-upon procedures of
interpreting them. In the end, however, it is difficult to say
whether the difference between aesthetic and scientific
judgments is an absolute one or one of degree; individual
cases differ from each other. In any case, for the sake of
clarifying comparison it is good to emphasize some differences
between typical aesthetic judging and the sort of measuring
that is often made use of in empirical research. Measuring
may have to do with features of objects, as well as with the
opinions of a certain human population, as was the case with
the Kaplans.
First, in measuring, the right solution will be found if the
measuring system is understood and the instruments and
procedures work properly. A professional land surveyor can
tell the exact size of a lot. Sometimes it is not even important
whether the measurement is based on a representation of the
object (a map) or on the actual object (the lot). Nothing like
this is possible in aesthetic judgments.
Second, changing the measurer does not affect the result of
measuring, unlike aesthetic judgments, which can vary to a
great extent if the evaluator is changed.
Third, the result of a measurement only informs us about
certain features of the object, and the objects that are on the
same level and on the scale are equal from the point of view
of measuring. Aesthetic judgments, in turn, may tell us about
very many different features of the object. Because of this,
directing action based on measurements is easier than giving
aesthetically oriented orders. An order to provide a one-foot
long piece of birch plank is much easier to understand than an
order to provide a beautiful piece of birch plank.
Fourth, the result of a measurement does not change if one
gets new information about some other aspect of the object.
The size of the lot remains the same despite what might take
place on it; on the other hand, aesthetic quality may well
change according to associated actions. For example, a yard
that at first looks good may suddenly turn gloomy and sad if
one hears that extremely poisonous substances have been
used in fighting the weeds.
Fifth, the unit or characteristic of an object being measured is
normally clear, while it is often somewhat unclear in
conversation whether one is discussing aesthetic or other
features of an object. For example, one may use terminology
that does not make clear whether one is making an aesthetic
or some other kind of judgment. The much used term

‘awesome’ can mean practically anything positive, not only
aesthetic success.
And lastly, in measuring one normally uses an evenly divided
and hierarchical scale. The numbers tell if something is
bigger, stronger, or warmer than something else and they also
reveal by how much it is different. No such scale or
instruments based on it exists for aesthetic judgments.
Welsch also admits in the end[18] that universal factors are
not quite suitable for explaining individual cases. There are
probably cross-cultural inclinations to aesthetically value
certain kinds of things, but the ways in which individual cases
modify these general trends and how things may be
aesthetically valued in entirely different ways must be
pondered on case-by-case basis. There are no measuring
tools or rules for this. Such pondering, which is typically
verbal, is exactly the context in which and the tool by which a
judgment is identified as aesthetic in the first place. Through
it, the judgment is connected with a certain cultural tradition.
This pondering itself is, at least, proto-philosophical activity:
questioning, discussing, analyzing and comparing concepts,
reflecting language with the help of language. Often in
everyday life we simply have no other choice than to turn to
it; no exact measurements and empirical studies can be done.
This is why beauty still cannot be measured, but must instead
be discussed and philosophized.      
4. Philosophical and Non-Philosophical Views of
Reception
If aesthetic judgments cannot be proved right or wrong
through studying the empirical features of objects, would
empirical study of receivers produce better results? Colin
Martindale believes in the value of this approach and makes a
comparison: ”It is impossible to list the objective features
shared by beautiful objects. Beauty is not in the eye of the
beholder, but in the brain of the beholder.”[19]
As we saw, Welsch thinks that experiencing beauty is some
sort of brain-happiness. According to him there are at least
three types of this phenomenon, and these types relate both
to different objects and different operational abilities of the
brain developed at different stages of human evolution.
When we perceive a body or landscape as beautiful, the
perception rests on the highly localized activation of a
specific neural pattern. When, by contrast, we perceive
forms of self-similarity as beautiful, the resonance of
contiguous cortical areas produces a significantly more
far-reaching activation of the cortex. The experience of
great, breath-taking beauty, finally, rests on an integral
activation of our entire aesthetic and cognitive
architecture. Now in each of these three cases the
implication is that beauty is actually brainhappiness.[20]
Likewise, in musicology it has also often been repeated that
certain sounds typically cause certain kinds of activations in
the brain, and that this fact has an evolutionary basis.[21]
Hence, it can be reasoned that probably somewhat similar
activations happen when we see beautiful people, enjoy a

landscape or listen to good music, even if there are variations
in the activation levels between different individual cases.
Seen from this point of view the experience of beauty always
happens in the brain. In the end, it might make no difference
if the experience is caused by an object, imagination, or a
drug if only the brain is activated, i.e., certain local or more
integral electrochemical changes occur.
But will the knowledge that such things happen in our brain
help us understand aesthetic judgments? I stand in my back
yard and claim that it looks good, and my friend disagrees.
Could the disagreement be solved by finding out what happens
in our brains?
The first problem is that in everyday life − where aesthetic
judgments typically take place − it is not possible to find out
what goes on in the brain; no more than it is possible to
measure people’s faces for finding out whether they are
statistically beautiful. The only “method” we normally have in
such situations is to discuss. I can point out some features of
the yard, describe my feelings, and make references to other
yards, and my friend can do the same. After some time we
may agree, at least in the sense that we use the same
terminology: the yard looks good. But we cannot get any
further in finding out whether we really agree or disagree.
There is no way we could test whether we really feel the same
feelings even if we use the same words, or determine whether
there are similar things happening in our brains. Even the
knowledge of whether the words we use have the same
positions in our own vocabularies (relate in the same ways to
other words and ways of action) necessarily remains more or
less unclear. How could it even be possible, in practice, to
pinpoint such positions? But it is interesting that in everyday
life all of these obstacles are normally not a problem and that
we can manage very well with such uncertainty.
But what if we were so lucky as to have a brain scientist with
her equipment quite unexpectedly come by? Could she show
that one of us is right?
It is possible to compare this situation with cases studied in
musicology. It is clear that music evokes strong feelings. But
it is quite as clear that any particular piece of music does not
have the same impact on everyone; the same piece might
evoke different reactions in different listeners and leave some
listeners quite cold. Compare for instance the varying impact
of the music of Claude Debussy and the metal band Slayer.
The experience of beauty or some other aesthetic feature is
not caused by any direct, uni-linear relationship to a particular
stimulus. But still, music activates the brain and such
activation can be measured quite independently of the type of
music. How should this be understood? Is there something
here that could clarify what happens when we judge my
backyard aesthetically?
What is especially interesting is that the activation of certain
“pleasure zones” of the brain does not seem to be specific for
experiencing musical or any other kind of beauty. Mari
Tervaniemi, who worked for the above-mentioned Braintuningproject, summarizes:
It appeared that the stronger the pleasure that the

music caused, the stronger the areas of the brain
(especially striatum, midbrain, amygdala as well as
orbitofrontal and prefrontal cortex) that play a part in
general emotional and motivational activity were
activated. It could be inferred that there is no specific
brain mechanism or structure for musical pleasure or
musical emotions, but that there is something very
similar in all emotional processes independently of the
sense modality or the cause of such processes.[22]
It is thus the same pleasure areas that become activated when
one is listening to music, having sex, eating good food or
perhaps imagining big business triumphs; sometimes locally,
sometimes more integrally. Unlike the description of the
Braintuning-project cited at the beginning of this article, which
could make one hope that “neural determinants” could be
found that would be specific for music experiences, this is not
the case, although much new information has been discovered
on the emotions connected with music and on what happens in
the brain as one is listening to it.[23]
This means that the activation of the brain that Welsch
connects with beauty in particular is in fact probably not
specific to it but has to do with pleasure and other positive
emotions much more generally. The same is probably true of
other modes of the aesthetic: ugliness, serenity, cuteness,
and numerous other variations of the aesthetic do not have
their own, specific brain mechanism or structure. Similar
things happening in the brain are conceptualized and described
in different ways in different situations. If certain objects do
not necessarily result in same aesthetic judgments, neither do
certain states of the brain.
This opens up further problems. First, it may be that the
same things are happening in me and my friend on the electrochemical level of our brains as we stand pondering my back
yard, but we might experience and conceptualize the situation
differently on our conscious level of thinking. I might think
that it is pleasurable and my friend that it is less so (when
compared to some other experiences), and this may result in
different verbal judgments. But before this can actually be
considered further, we should seek to know how exactly
similar are the states of our brains. There are no two
absolutely identical instances of brain development. So what
is similar, where and how? And what is not? What type of
similarity is relevant and why? There are, very probably, a
great many possible answers, but Welsch, for example, does
not deal with this issue.
Second, I may eventually arrive at a strong emotional state
during our discussion of my yard, while my friend simply
makes an analytical and professional analysis of the potential
price of the lot if it were sold. There are probably different
things going on in our brains, but does this mean that one of
us is right and the other is wrong?
Third, it could also happen that we experience the electrochemical changes in our brain as similar, as harmonic and
serene, but I may value this state of mind, whereas my friend
would like to have a more extreme experience. Or for some
reason, and this is by no means trivial because of the social
nature of aesthetic judgments, he wants to distance himself

from me and says that he disagrees even if all the things that
can be measured would make one think that we should agree.
He might want to impress his new friend, who is also there
with us.
The most important thing to notice, however, is that in normal
situations of aesthetic judging the agreement or disagreement
is only perceivable and realizable in our verbal and non-verbal
actions, not in our brains. We cannot observe even the
internal workings of our own brain but only those things that
are made explicit and brought into consciousness, typically by
language and action. We simply have to discuss whether we
are of the same opinion and ponder whether using the same
terminology is a reliable sign of agreement and whether using
different words means disagreement. Agreement and
disagreement may also have to do with whether the judgment
is aesthetic or of some other kind. This cannot be solved by
measuring changes in the brain because there seems to be no
specific brain mechanisms or structures for aesthetic
judgments or experiences. Moreover, similar brain states can
be connected to different culturally developed aesthetic
descriptions and conceptions. By measuring it can be shown
that the brain is strongly activated, but how this activation is
described and how it is verbally related to a certain object in a
certain context is much more important for aesthetic judging.
Punk, jazz, heavy rock, chamber music, and tango probably
cause similar brain states as activities as sex, a good meal, a
beautiful landscape, an interesting painting and a handsome
human body, but the ways in which all these are described in
various situations vary widely. And it is exactly in such
descriptions that aesthetics as a cultural entity lives and
develops. As electrochemical events, internal brain activities
remain hidden in our bodies while our verbal descriptions and
explicit actions do not.
5. A Taste of Rhetoric
The ability to make aesthetic judgments and discuss them is
one of the pivotal skills of human beings. It is often called
“taste” and it is needed in social interaction all the time: in
selecting objects, polite behavior, art, science, fashion, politics
– everywhere. A wrong judgment may result in exclusion from
a group; a correct one opens doors and strengthens ties to a
group. Skillful use of taste affects our well-being and because,
nothing, no measurement or scientific experiment, can replace
it, it must continuously be rehearsed and practiced.
This ability is evaluated by others whenever we make aesthetic
judgments. David Hume stated that individuals who have
good taste must have “strong sense, united to delicate
sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and
cleared of all prejudice” and they make their judgments with
the help of these faculties. Another way to see it is that they
have rhetorical skills, the abilities to speak and write
persuasively and convincingly. The point is to get others to
agree, not to find an absolute truth. Whether we agree or
disagree can be explained by analyzing the situations where
taste and rhetorical skills are used, not by measuring the
states of the brain or studying our evolution.
It is also evident that taste and rhetorical skills have their own
evolutionary background and are not independent of the brain

or the features of the objects discussed. Rhetoric can be
studied by scientific, empirical methods, even measured.[24]
However, if one tries to clarify aesthetic judgments from this
perspective, one faces similar problems to those I have
described above. One would thus probably be better off
concentrating on studying the rhetorical uses of language from
a philosophical perspective. This assertion is not a new one
for aesthetics, as Ludwig Wittgenstein already suggested in
approaching aesthetic issues as cultural-linguistic ones, but
the approach is still useful and non-philosophical ones cannot
replace it; Sibley’s notions are still relevant. It is clear that
the philosophy used does not have to be based on
Wittgenstein’s thinking. Martin Heidegger, John Dewey,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Rancière, for example,
would open different perspectives, and sometimes it is in order
to emphasize that the cultural-linguistic approach cannot only
deal with written and oral language but must also acknowledge
physical, bodily experiences. However, if all this is analyzed
philosophically, we must necessarily use verbal language.
Different people produce different aesthetic judgments and
interpretations or theories of them. From the philosophical
point of view, such “meta-level” interpretations are actually
very similar to judgments: they are more or less convincing
conceptualizations of their objects and they are presented to
other people in social interaction. They both use natural
languages. Both are related to things happening in the brain
and the body, but studying such material-level events does not
make judgments or their interpretations understandable.
Here, one has to analyze verbal language – rhetoric and
individual concepts – and this is only possible with the help of
this same language. This, in turn, is philosophical activity,
especially if one arrives at radical questioning of traditional
ways of thinking. It is quite possible that we will never
achieve the final and unquestionable understanding of
aesthetic judgments. We are doomed to discuss.[25]
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